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Motor Vehicles
Motor Vehicles; subsequent convictions for driving under the
influence-increased penalties
Vehicle Code §§23101, 23102, 23105, 23106 (amended).
SB 250 (Presley); STATS 1977, Ch 592
Support: California Highway Patrol
Minimum penalties for second and subsequent convictions for driving
while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs have been increased by
Chapter 592, when either the first or subsequent conviction was a felony-
misdemeanor involving bodily injury or death to someone other than the
driver. Previously existing law provided specified penalties for conviction
of driving under the influence of drugs [CAL. VEH. CODE §23106], intox-
icating liquor, or the combination of intoxicating liquor and drugs [CAL.
VEH. CODE §23 101], which proximately caused bodily injury to any person
other than the driver, but provided for no increased penalty upon a subse-
quent conviction under the same or any other driving-under-the-influence
statute [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §§339, 340, at -, -]. The only
penalty for conviction under either statute was imprisonment in the county
jail for at least 90 days but less than one year or in the state prison (for 16
months, two years, or three years [See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18]) and a fine of
between $250 and $5000 [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §§339, 340, at -, -
]. Such a sentence, however, could be suspended or the convicted person
could be placed on probation in lieu of serving such a sentence [CAL. PENAL
CODE §1203.1].
Chapter 592 amends Vehicle Code Sections 23101 and 23106 to provide
that if a person is convicted under either statute and has a previous convic-
tion within five years under either Section 23102 (misdemeanor driving
under the influence of alcohol or combination of alcohol and drugs) or
23105 (misdemeanor driving under the influence of drugs) of the Vehicle
Code he or she must serve a minimum of five days and no more than one
year in the county jail and pay a fine of between $250 and $5000 [CAL. VEH.
CODE §§23101(d), 23106(d)]. If the prior conviction within five years was
for violation of either Section 23101 or 23106, then the minimum jail
sentence is increased to 90 days, with all other provisions remaining the
same [See CAL. VEH. CODE §§23101(d), 23106(d)]. If the probation is
granted to a person convicted under these sections, then a condition of such
probation is that he or she must serve the minimum time in confinement and
pay the minimum fine [CAL. VEH. CODE §§23101(d), 23106(d)].
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Sections 23101 and 23106 have also been amended to specifically deny
power to a court to absolve a person with any subsequent driving-under-the-
influence conviction from spending the minimum amount of time in con-
finement and paying the minimum specified fine [CAL. VEH. CODE
§§23101(e), 23106(e)] except in "unusual cases" in which the interest of
justice demands that the court strike a previous conviction for purposes of
sentencing [CAL. VEH. CODE §§23101(f), 23106(f)]. In such cases, if a
court orders a previous conviction stricken, the court is required to state the
reasons for so doing [CAL. VEH. CODE §§23101(f), 23106(f)]. On appeal by
the state, it is to be conclusively presumed that the only reasons for striking
the prior conviction are the reasons stated by the court, and the order will be
reversed if such reasons do not constitute a "substantial basis" for such an
order [CAL. VEH. CODE §§23101(f), 23106(f)]. These provisions are now
virtually identical to those contained in Sections 23102 and 23105 [Com-
pare CAL. VEH. CODE §§23101(e), (f) and 23106(e), (f) with CAL. VEH.
CODE §§23102(f), (g), and 23105(g), (h)].
Sections 23102 and 23105 have also been amended by Chapter 592 to
provide that a conviction under either section within five years of a prior
conviction under Section 23101 or 23106 must be punished by imprison-
ment of between five days and one year in the county jail and a fine of
between $250 and $1000 [CAL. VEH. CODE §§23102(d), 23105(e)]. A
condition of probation for such a subsequent conviction is that the person
must serve the minimum time in confinement and pay the minimum fine
[CAL. VEH. CODE §§23102(e), 23105(f)]. The court's power to absolve such
punishment or strike the previous conviction for purposes of sentencing are
subject to the same restrictions imposed by Sections 23101 and 23106 [See
CAL. VEH. CODE §§23102(f), (g), 23105(g), (h)].
Chapter 592 also amends Sections 23101(a), 23106(a), and 23106(b) to
add "death" to "bodily injury" as the types of harm to a person other than
the convicted party which if present, distinguish felony-misdemeanor from
misdemeanor driving under the influence. These amendments bring the
subsections into conformity with subsection (b) of 23101. Thus, Chapter
592 amends the Vehicle Code to provide mandatory jail sentences for
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs if the convict-
ed person has a prior driving-under-the-influence conviction within five
years of the latest offense and if either the prior or subsequent offense was
the proximate cause of death or bodily injury to anyone other than himself or
herself.
See Generally:
1) 5 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1973 LEGISLATION 445 (drunk driving penalties) (1974).
2) 4 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1972 LEGISLATION 551 (driving under the influence)
(1973).
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Motor Vehicles; drunk driving alternative sentencing
Vehicle Code §23102.1 (new); §§13201.5, 13352.5 (amended);
Welfare and Institutions Code Article 5 (commencing with § 19975.01)
(new).
SB 38 (Gregorio); STATS. 1977, Ch 890
Support: California Attorney General; California Peace Officers' Associ-
ation
Chapter 890 authorizes counties to establish alcohol abuse treatment
programs in which a convicted misdemeanor drunk driver may, with court
approval, choose to participate for one year in lieu of suspension of his or
her driving privilege and/or a jail sentence [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§19975.01-. 13]. This statewide authorization for such programs follows a
four-country experiment authorized by the legislature in 1975 [See CAL.
STATS. 1975, c. 1133, §2, at 2805].
Vehicle Code Section 23102 generally provides that a first conviction for
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a combination of
intoxicating liquor and drugs is punishable by imprisonment in the county
jail from 48 hours to six months and a fine of between $250 and $500 [CAL.
VEH. CODE §23102(c)]. The court may, however, impose a lesser fine if the
convicted person consents to and participates in a driver improvement
and/or habitual user of alcohol treatment program [CAL. VEH. CODE
§23102(c)]. In addition, Penal Code Section 1203 allows a judge to sum-
marily grant probation to a person convicted of such a misdemeanor [CAL.
PENAL CODE §1203(c)]. A second conviction under Section 23102 within
five years of a prior conviction under Section 23102, 23105, or 23106 is
punishable by imprisonment of between 48 hours and one year and a fine of
between $250 and $1000 [CAL. VEH. CODE §23102(d)]. If the prior convic-
tion was for a driving-under-the-influence offense that proximately caused
the death of, or bodily injury to, any other person, the minimum jail term
under this section is five days [See CAL. VEH. CODE §23102(d). See
generally CAL. VEH. CODE §§23101, 23106]. A condition of any probation
for such a subsequent conviction is that the person must spend the minimum
time in jail and pay a fine [CAL. VEH. CODE §23102(e)]. The court has no
power under this section to asolve a person from such punishment upon a
second conviction [CAL. VE11. CODE §23102(f)] except in "unusual cases"
in which the court may strike a prior conviction in the interest of justice
[CAL. VEH. CODE §23102(g)]. Chapter 890 adds Section 23102.1 to the
Vehicle Code to expressly modify this required condition of probation to
now allow a court to suspend execution of the mandatory jail sentence if the
defendant consents to participate, for at least one year in a manner satisfac-
tory to the court, in an approved alcohol abuse treatment program [See
generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§19975.01-.13].
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The Vehicle Code also provides for discretionary suspension by the court
of a person's driving privilege upon conviction of driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or the combination of alcohol and drugs [CAL. VEH. CODE
§13201.5]. In addition, the Department of Motor Vehicles is generally
required to suspend the driving privilege of persons convicted of drunk
driving, except, in specified circumstances, for misdemeanor first offenders
[See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352]. Chapter 890 provides courts with an
alternative to license suspension [CAL. VEH. CODE §23102.1 ] and prohibits
the Department from suspending the license of a convicted person who
agrees to and participates in, an approved alcohol abuse treatment program
for at least one year in a manner satisfactory to the court [CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 13352.5. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE § 13201.5 with CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §19975.011.
Chapter 890 also establishes detailed requirements for approval of alcohol
abuse treatment programs and provides for participation therein [See
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§19975.01-.13]. To qualify a person for
participation in an approved program, the court may consider any relevant
information about the person contained in a presentence investigation report
or made available through other eligibility screening procedures [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 19975.01(b)]. Such information, however, cannot be
furnished by one who also provides services or has any interest in a privately
operated, approved treatment program [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 19975.01(b)]. Furthermore, the court must obtain a copy of the convicted
person's driving record to determine the person's eligibility for the program
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.01(b)]. The court may also require, as a
condition of participation, that the convicted person furnish proof of ability
to respond in damages as defined in Vehicle Code Section 16430 [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 19975.02(d)] and no person shall be eligible for
readmission into such a program if the date of the offense for which he or
she is subsequently convicted is within four years of the date he or she
previously ceased participation in such a program [CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §19975.04].
Failure to comply with the rules and regulations of, or to complete, the
prescribed treatment program shall result in the court's revocation of the
suspension of the original sentence and/or revocation and termination of
probation, and the court must proceed in the manner provided in Penal Code
Section 1203.2(c) [CAL. VEH. CODE §23102.1]. The court must also im-
mediately suspend or order suspension of the convicted driver's driving
privilege [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.02(a)]. Furthermore, courts
are to require periodic reports on each person referred to such a program and
an immediate report on any failure by a participant to comply with the rules
and regulations of the program [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.02(a)].
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Moreover, failure of a participant to consent to a chemical test for determin-
ing blood alcohol levels, as provided for in Vehicle Code Section 13353,
shall result in termination from the program and suspension or revocation of
the driving privilege for the period prescribed in Section 13352 for the
original offense for which he or she was convicted in addition to the six
month's suspension for such refusal provided for in Section 13353 [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.02(b)].
The goal of the program shall be to enable each participant to successfully
address his or her alcohol abuse or alcoholism, to eliminate dependence on
alcohol, and to protect public health and safety on the highways [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.05(a)(5)]. The State Office of Alcoholism has
sole authority for program approval [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§19975.05(a)], and courts may refer persons only to approved programs
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.01(c)]. Withdrawal of approval by the
Office shall result in the Department of Motor Vehicles revoking or sus-
pending the driving privilege of participants who do not commence partici-
pation in another approved program within 21 days [CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §19975.02(c)].
All approved programs must include: individual, biweekly face-to-
face interviews with each participant [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 19975.05(a)(1)]; approved fee schedules for participants and provisions for
persons who cannot afford such fees [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 19975.05(a)(2)]; either a variety of treatment services for problem drinkers
and alcoholics or the capability of referring such persons to similar services
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.05(a)(3)]; prescribed standards for
other services, which may include lectures, classes, group discussions, and
individual counseling [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19075.05(a)(3)]; and
when appropriate, services to ethnic minorities, women, youth, or any other
group with particular needs relating to the program [CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §19975.05(a)(4)]. In addition, the Office of Alcoholism may adopt
other standards to be issued in the form of regulations to assure effective
implementation of the procedures [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§19975.05(c)].
Counties are not required to establish these programs [CAL. STATS. 1977,
c. 890, §6, at -], and two or more counties may jointly establish a program
when it is not feasible to do so individually [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§19975.11]. Also, a court is to transfer, after conviction, all post-judgment
matters to the court in the county of the convicted person's residence for
further proceedings regarding program participation if the person agrees to
participate in a program in his or her county of residence or a county closer
to his or her residence [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.03]. Administra-
tive responsibilities for each program are to be delegated by the county
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board of supervisors to the alcholism administrator, or where none exists, to
the head of a health-related agency or department pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 19923 [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 19975.07(b)].
Finally, the application of these programs as an alternative to a jail
sentence or driving privilege suspension is prospective only [CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §19975.13]. Therefore the alleged offense must have been
committed on or after January 1, 1978, and on or after the date on which the
program to which the convicted person is to be referred has been approved
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §19975.13].
Thus, persons convicted of misdemeanor drunk driving will have the
opportunity to participate for one year in closely monitored programs de-
signed to eliminate alcohol abuse in lieu of a jail sentence and loss of driving
privilege if counties establish a program as authorized by Chapter 890 and if
such participation is approved by the court. Such an alternative is perhaps
most significant for persons with prior drunk driving convictions who would
otherwise face mandatory jail sentences and loss of driving privilege.
Motor Vehicles; drugs
Vehicle Code §40300.5 (amended).
AB 62 (McAlister); STATS 1977, Ch 16
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Highway
Patrol; California Peace Officers' Association
Chapter 16 amends Section 40300.5 of the Vehicle Code to authorize a
peace officer to arrest a person involved in a traffic accident if the officer has
reasonable cause to believe the person had been driving under the influence
of any drug (a misdemeanor under Vehicle Code Section 23105) even
though the officer was not a witness to such driving. Section 40300.5 is an
exception to Penal Code Section 836, which authorizes a warrantless arrest
for a misdemeanor only if the crime was committed in the officer's pres-
ence. Previously, an arrest under Section 40300.5 was allowed only if the
officer had reasonable cause to believe that the suspect had been driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or the combination of drugs and
liquor [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 956, at 1904]. Chapter 16 corrects an apparent
oversight and authorizes a warrantless arrest when the officer has reasonable
cause to believe the suspect had been driving under the influence solely of
drugs.
See Generally:
I) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEGISLATION 220
(misdemeanor arrests) (1969).
2) 3 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1971 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 373 (drugs-driving
under the influence) (1972).
Selected 1977 California Legislation 
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Motor Vehicles; challenging prior convictions
Vehicle Code §23102.2 (amended).
SB 619 (Song); STATS 1977, Ch 186
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Judges'
Association
Chapter 186 has amended Section 23102.2 of the Vehicle Code to provide
that in a proceeding to have a previous misdemeanor driving-under-the-
influence-of-drugs-and/or-liquor conviction declared invalid on constitu-
tional grounds, the defendant must serve notice on the court that rendered
the prior judgment at least five court days prior to this subsequent hearing
[CAL. VEH. CODE §23102.2(a)]. This section, also, retains language requir-
ing that such a defendant file with the clerk of the court hearing the present
proceeding and the prosecuting attorney in the present proceeding, at least
five court days prior to the hearing on the alleged constitutional violation, a
written and specific statement as to how his or her constitutional rights were
violated [CAL. VEH. CODE §23102.2(a)]. This same statement when proper-
ly served on the court that rendered the prior conviction constitutes notice to
this court pursuant to Section 23102.2(a) of the Vehicle Code.
A prior conviction for driving under the influence is important in subse-
quent proceedings because of enhanced penalties, including mandatory jail
sentence, upon a subsequent conviction for a similar offense [See CAL.
VEH. CODE §§23102(d), (e), (f), 23105(e), (f), (g)]. In Boykin v. Alabama
[395 U.S. 238 (1969)], the United States Supreme Court held that a court
may not presume from a "silent record" that a defendant voluntarily and
knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights, which he or she implicit-
ly relinquished by entering a guilty plea [Id. at 242-44]. Taking into account
the then recent Boykin decision, the California Supreme Court ruled in In re
Tahl [1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969)] that a trial
court record must contain "on its face" direct evidence that the defendant
was aware of three major constitutional rights (privilege against self incrimi-
nation, right to confrontation of one's accusers, right to jury trial) and
voluntarily waived them prior to the guilty plea in order for that conviction
to withstand a subsequent collateral attack [Id. at 132, 460 P.2d at 456, 81
Cal. Rptr. at 584]. While originally applied only to felony convictions, the
Tahl requirement was later prospectively extended to misdemeanor convic-
tions [Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 301-02, 515 P.2d 273,
282-83, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 338-39 (1973)]. Before sentencing a person
convicted of driving under the influence, the court must obtain from the
Department of Motor Vehicles a record of any prior traffic convictions
[CAL. VEH. CODE §13209]. Nevertheless, in any actual hearing on the
constitutional validity of a prior driving-under-the-influence conviction, the
1, Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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prosecution continues to have the burden of producing evidence of such
prior offenses [CAL. VEH. CODE §23102.2(b)(2)]. The prosecution may
satisfy this burden by introducing an abstract of judgment or a minute order
of the court [Hanlon & Ferber, The Talisman of In Re Tahl: Effects on
Misdemeanor Drunk Driving Convictions, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 437, 442
(1973)]. The defendant then has the burden of producing evidence that his or
her constitutional rights were infringed upon at the prior proceeding [CAL.
VEH. CODE §23102.2(b)(3)]. This may be done by introducing the docket of
the original proceeding, which, if silent as to the validity of his or her
waiver, will be sufficient to support the motion to strike the prior conviction
from the accusatory pleading-absent further rebutting evidence by the
prosecution [See Hanlon & Ferber, The Talisman of In Re Tahl: Effects on
Misdemeanor Drunk Driving Convictions, 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 437, 442-43
(1973). See generally Gonzalez v. Municipal Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 706,
710-11 & n.5, 108 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 & n.5 (1973) (Section 23102.2
motion to strike a prior conviction relates only to the accusatory pleadings
and should not be confused with a motion to vacate the prior judgment)].
Thus, by requiring notice of the constitutional challenge of a prior convic-
tion to be served on the court that rendered the challenged judgment, it
appears that the intent of Chapter 186 is to ensure that the court rendering
the prior conviction is afforded the opportunity to be made aware of a
challenge to the constitutionality of the judgment and to enable it to supple-
ment the record before the present court, for example, by possibly supplying
a transcript of the previous proceeding in which the defendant waived his or
her rights, if such a record exists [See Hanlon & Ferber, The Talisman of In
Re Tahl: Effects on Misdemeanor Drunk Driving Convictions, 7 U.S.F.L.
REV. at 443].
See Generally:
I) 5 PAC. L.J., RFVIFW OF SELECTED 1973 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 445 (procedure for
challenging prior conviction) (1974).
Motor Vehicles; inadmissibility of evidence
Vehicle Code §§40807, 41103.2 (new); §§4760, 4762, 4763, 41103,
41103.5 (amended).
SB 914 (Foran); STATS 1977, Ch 804
Support: Court Clerks of the Judicial Courts; Department of Motor
Vehicles
Chapter 804 adds Section 40807 to the Vehicle Code to prohibit, with
specified exceptions, "any court in any criminal action" (emphasis added)
from admitting into evidence the record of any action taken by the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles [hereinafter DMV] against a person's driving
Selected 1977 California Legislation
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privilege or any testimony regarding the proceedings at, or concerning, or
produced at "any hearing held in connection with such action" (emphasis
added). The exceptions to this exclusionary rule consist of testimony or
records that are: (1) necessary to enforce the law relating to driving without
a valid license or when the driving privilege has been suspended or revoked;
(2) needed in a prosecution for failure to disclose any matter at such a
hearing when required by law to do so; or (3) introduced solely to impeach
the credibility of a witness [See CAL. VEH. CODE §40807].
Since the language of Section 40807 expressly renders records of DMV
action against a person's driving privilege and hearing-related testimony
inadmissible in "any court in any criminal action" (emphasis added), it
appears that this exclusion does not give standing to object to the introduc-
tion of such evidence solely to the person whose traffic record was at issue
in the hearing. Rather, unless it fits into one of the three narrow exceptions,
Section 40807 will apparently grant third party standing and thereby pre-
clude admission of such evidence even in criminal actions only remotely
related to the person's traffic record. For instance, if a DMV hearing officer
should be criminally charged with accepting a bribe for "fixing" the
outcome of the hearing (action or nonaction), the record of the DMV's
disposition of the case as well as any testimony regarding or produced at
the hearing, will be inadmissible and may not be offered by either the
defense or the prosecution, even though it may be material in the subsequent
criminal proceeding [See CAL. VEH. CODE §40807]. By the same token, if a
witness to an alleged traffic violation or the arresting police officer testifies
under oath at a hearing in which the defendant is adequately represented by
counsel with full opportunity to cross examine and challenge such testimony
and that officer or witness should later die before the criminal trial of the
defendant, then the sworn testimony apparently will be not admissible under
Section 40807, even though such testimony might otherwise be admissible
under the "former testimony" exception to the hearsay rule [See generally
CAL. EVID. CODE §§1290(b), 1291(a)(2)]. By contrast, the author of this
legislation has indicated that Section 40807 was intended to allow "a person
to give testimony and present evidence of his defense at administrative hear-
ings without having that evidence, testimony, or resulting action used
against him in the criminal trial" [Letter from Senator John F. Foran to
William Follett, October 19, 1977 (emphasis added), (copy on file at the
Pacific Law Journal)]. Furthermore, the author has stated that this new
provision was also intended "to allow for. . . any prosecution not arising
from the same evidence on which the administrative hearing and action was
based" [Id. (emphasis added)]. This apparent difference between a literal
reading of Section 40807 and the author's stated intent may be clarified by
either subsequent legislative amendment or by court construction.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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The language of Section 40807 also indicates that only records of "action
taken by the department against a person's" driving privilege and tes-
timony concerning hearings related to "such action" are inadmissible in
court (emphasis added). Therefore, it appears if a hearing is held, but does
not result in "action against" a person's driving privilege, the testimony
produced at the hearing will not be rendered inadmissible under Section
40807. For instance, if a person accused of refusing to take a blood alcohol
test appears at a department hearing and makes an incriminating statement,
but for some reason the department does not take action against his or her
driving privilege (e.g., the department finds the person was not properly
warned that such refusal would result in license suspension pursuant to
Vehicle Code Section 13353(a)), it appears that this testimony may be
admissible in a later criminal trial on the matter [See CAL. VEH. CODE
§40807. See generally CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353]. On the basis of this literal
interpretation of the statute, it is arguable that a person appearing at a DMV
hearing in which he or she faces suspension of his or her driving privilege,
cannot be assured, at least until after the hearing, that what was said during
these proceedings will not be used against that person in a later criminal
proceeding. Thus, a logical result may be that such a person's attorney may,
to protect his or her client's interest, advise the client at the hearing to
invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which
could hinder the probative value of such hearings.
Chapter 804 also authorizes the DMV to charge an administrative fee for
collecting bail for outstanding parking violations and related offenses at the
time of vehicle registration and makes other conforming changes [See CAL.
VEH. CODE §§4760, 4762, 4763, 41103, 41103.2, 41103.5]. In conclusion,
Chapter 804 provides that records of DMV action against a person's driving
privilege and testimony produced at the related hearings are inadmissible,
with specified exceptions, in any court in any criminal proceeding, thereby
extending the rule that formerly applied only in civil actions [Compare CAL.
VEH. CODE §40807 with CAL. VEH. CODE §§40832-40834].
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